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Like many other members of the legal academy,' I have long admired, and
profited from, James Boyd White's work on the intersections of law and
literature. Drawing from his literary commitments2 the importance of relying
on narratives rather than on abstract propositional utterances for the notions that
constitute our culture and provide our norms, he was at the forefront of those
who emphasized the necessity to pay attention to "the reality of the experience
of other people, and [to the] importance of their stories, told in their words."
3
• Hart Wright Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
•* Hereinafter cited by page number only.
t Angus G. Wynne, Sr. Professor of Civil Jurisprudence, University of Texas Law School. I want to
thank Betty Sue Flowers, Fred Schauer, and Richard Weisberg for their very helpful responses to earlier
drafts of this review.
1. See, e.g., Elkins, The Stories We Tell Ourselves in Law, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 54 n.13 (1990)
(encomium to White). Many other examples of White's impact on the thought (and even lives) of others
could easily be given.
2. White is a professor of English language and literature and adjunct professor of classical studies
at the University of Michigan, as well as the holder of a chair within the University of Michigan Law
School.
3. J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 132 (1985).
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Through careful listening to these stories, he suggests, we can achieve what he
calls "the true political nature of the law," which is to serve as "a way of
establishing community and giving meaning to experience."4 And White's
notion of community includes a strong commitment to justice, described by him
as including the capacity for "[m]any-voicedness; the integration of thought and
feeling; the acknowledgment of the limits of one's mind and language (and an
openness to change them)."' These characteristics, he argues, should be present
in the legal analyst, including the judge; indeed, discussing what constituted
an admirable legal opinion, he subordinates the overt "message" contained
within the formal propositions of an opinion to "the experience of mind it holds
out as a model of legal thought: the language it makes as it places one item
next to another, the community it makes with its several audiences."'6
It is of some significance that the quotations in the paragraph above come
from one of his earlier books, Heracles' Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and
Poetics of the Law, published in 1985. Reviewing it, I indicated that "[o]ne
need not agree with White's analyses in order to respond with great pleasure
to the 'experience of mind' that he holds out."7 The pleasure came in part from
the contact with "a man passionately concerned with basic issues of justice and
human community who believes that our progress toward an almost Platonic
good can be aided by a greater self-consciousness about our ways of reading
and writing."8 Like many of his other admirers, I noted that "I felt called upon
to become more caring myself in my own capacities as a writer, reader, and
teacher of law."9 To put it mildly, this was not meant as small praise.
Still, my review, for all of its apparent enthusiasm, contained some reserva-
tions. In spite of his emphasis on the importance of literary models to the
development of one's capacity for sensitive legal analysis, I found him strangely
silent regarding the various debates raging among literary critics and contem-
porary philosophers about topics seemingly relevant to his enterprise. A reader
would not learn of the existence (or potential relevance) of such writers as
Jacques Derrida, Stanley Fish, Elaine Showalter, or Richard Rorty, to offer only
four examples. Moreover, he seemed to present an overly-rosy picture of law,
especially in a chapter analyzing the Socratic critique of the rhetorician-lawyer
in the Gorgias. Although perhaps not quite so complacent as Charles Fried,
who unforgettably insisted that good lawyers, at least in contemporary Ameri-
can society, need never worry that their goodness as lawyers would call into
question their goodness as persons,10 White seemed to discount any real force
4. Id. at 78.
5. Id. at 132.
6. Id. at 118.
7. Levinson, Book Review, 97 ETHIcs 666, 667 (1987).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85
YALE U. 1060 (1976).
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to the Socratic critique of lawyers as mere technicians prepared to devote their
intellectual talents to making the lesser appear the greater, the unjust, just."
Unfortunately, these disquieting notes, which were not enough to outweigh
my genuine esteem for Heracles' Bow, now seem glaring in regard to White's
new book, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism.
Part of the problem is that the new book substantially repeats themes already
well discussed in earlier work. There is, therefore, little sense of a real advance
on what was achieved in Heracles' Bow or his earlier book of essays, When
Words Lose Their Meaning.2 It is difficult for me to believe that anyone who
has read the earlier work really needs to read the new one, though those who
have not might well begin (and perhaps end) with Justice as Translation.
Unabashed admirers of the earlier work might not care about its relative lack
of freshness. But even slightly constrained admirers will notice ever more the
renewed presence of some of the deficiencies of these earlier works.
Most of the chapters of Justice as Translation were previously published,
and I liked almost all of them when I initially read them. One of them is
reprinted in a book that I coedited on the problems of legal interpretation. 3
Yet the joinder of what were quite fine independent essays in a single book has
served to diminish their overall force, to create a whole that is ultimately less
than the sum of its parts. Although I continue to share many aspects of White's
vision and am happy to acknowledge the many real contributions he has made,
I think it is more than time for him to confront some of the tensions that
pervade his work and vitiate his analysis. 4 I will devote this review to spell-
ing out some of these points.
II. PROPOSITIONAL UTTERANCE OR EXPERIENTIAL NARRATION?
There is a certain difficulty in writing this review, which should be ac-
knowledged at the outset. It arises from the fact that White devotes almost the
entire first section of his book to attacking what might be termed propositional
argumentation, i.e., the reliance on abstract concepts to provide at least the
11. Nor did White argue, as does Stanley Fish, for example, that the Socratic distinction between
knowledge and opinion so central to the critique of rhetoric is itself merely rhetorical inasmuch as rhetoric
is all there is. See generally S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY ch. 20 (1988) ("Rhetoric"). Indeed,
given White's distinction between "engag[ing a reader] dialectically instead of trying to manipulate him
rhetorically," J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTTruTION AND RECONSTITUTION OF
LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMuNrIY 220 (1984), there is every reason to believe that he would reject
Fish's argument.
12. J.B. WHITE, supra note 11.
13. See White, Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L. REV. 835 (1986), reprinted in condensed form in
TRPR.ETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 393 (S. Levinson & S. Mailloux eds.
1988). The article also appears in a revised form as chapter six of Justice as Translation.
14. See also Tushnet, Translation as Argument (Book Review), 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 105 (1990).
Although Tushnet's review goes off in somewhat different directions from this one, I concur almost entirely
with the criticisms directed at White, and I strongly recommend it to anyone interested in White's work.
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entry point for one's analyses of the world."5 The "shimmering and fluid
world of language"' 6 just does not allow the creation of intellectual systems
that truly transcend the individuals who make use of abstract concepts. "Words,
and other language forms, simply do not mean-not ever-exactly the same
thing to all users of them, as the builders of intellectual systems must claim or
at least hope to achieve."' 7 Thus "the art of law is not that of linear reasoning
to a secure conclusion." Instead it is an art that is "fundamentally literary and
rhetorical in kind, of comprehension and integration: the art of creating a
text-a mind and a community-which can comprise two things at once, and
two things pulling in different directions."'
8
I have no real problem with such an argument, as I assume is true of almost
anyone who has drunk from any post-Wittgensteinian, post-structuralist, or post-
modernist well. Much of my own work is explicitly nonlinear, 9 and, for better
or worse, the most quoted single sentence I have ever written is one stating that
"[t]here are as many plausible readings of the United States Constitution as
there are versions of Hamlet, even though each interpreter, like each director,
might genuinely believe that he or she has stumbled onto the one best answer
to the conundrums of the texts."'2 I think I well appreciate the reasons that
White wants to lead us away from a callow belief in abstract conceptualization
or an artless linguistic formalism as helpful modes of coming to terms with the
exigencies of our lives. The problem these days may be finding someone who
unabashedly defends the kind of conceptualization that White attacks.
2'




19. See S. LEViNSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FArm 5-6 (1988): "My concern is not so much to make a linear
argument aimed at moving the reader toward some purportedly ineluctable conclusions ... as to attempt
what I hope will become a common exploration of what is at stake in taking the Constitution seriously as
a presence in one's life ...."
20. Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373, 391 (1982). For a representative attack, see
R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 262-63 (1988).
21. Richard Posner, the implicit focus of White's attack on economic conceptualism, certainly does
not. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 20, at 308-09, in which he praises Potter Stewart's famous comment
about pornography--"I know it when I see it"-by reference to its "candor (in acknowledging the limits
of legal reasoning) and bluntness [in] refreshing contrast to the characteristic evasions of the modern judicial
opinion" and "avoidance of the concrete." "There are obvious dangers if judges lose sight of the conse-
quences of their decisions and fool themselves into thinking that they inhabit a purely conceptual realm."
See also Posner, Us v. Them (Book Review), NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 15, 1990, at 47, 48 (reviewing M.
MINOw, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990)):
What is familiar seems natural and what is natural seems immutable, so we must keep up
our guard against complacency. We can do this only by becoming self-critical, by multiplying
our skepticisms, our perspectives, our empathies.
All this is true, and important, and still resisted so strenuously as to be worth reiteration.
Its neglect continues to cause needless cruelties and injustices. Moreover, it is a lesson particularly
worth emphasizing to lawyers... because legal reasoning is a bastion of dichotomous classifi-
cations that over-simplify social reality and confuse local, transient, sometimes uninformed public
opinion with durable, even metaphysical, reality.
This theme pervades Posner's new book, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990). See Levinson, Strolling
Down the Path of the Law (and Toward Critical Legal Studies?): The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner,
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All of this being said, it is also true, as drinkers from the same wells must
acknowledge, that one can scarcely speak at all without using highly conceptual
language. One point, I presume, of the anthropological approaches counseling
the importance of "thick description,"' is that what appear to be the slightest
ephemera of everyday life-a wink, for example--can lead us into the highly
ramified concepts that constitute a culture. Thus many of us interested (or
obsessed) by problems of interpretation insist, against our more
"commonsensical" colleagues, that even the most apparently mundane observa-
tions about everyday life are embedded within highly complex-and debat-
able-theories, the elucidation of which certainly can require high conceptual
language. It is surely on point that Professor Geoffrey Miller, in the course of
a generally favorable review of White's 1984 book, When Words Lose Their
Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and
Community, notes that White presents "a theory of language and of human
interaction .... [that] has its stock of words used in unfamiliar or technical
senses" and that "[k]ey concepts in Professor White's picture of language are
'language,' 'text,' 'community,' and 'character. "'I It may simply be, to adopt
a term recently presented by my colleague Jack Balkin in these pages, that
abstract conceptualism and narrative contextualism are joined together in a
"nested opposition," coexisting in endless, albeit uneasy, tension. 2
Still, to treat Justice as Translation as the incarnation of propositional,
conceptual utterances, which I then endorse or criticize as is my wont, might
be quite profoundly to miss the point of White's own enterprise. After all, for
White, legal texts are usefully analyzed as if they were literary texts, and
"[1]iterary texts," he tells us, are "not propositional, but experiential and
performative. ' 26 Even more to the point, they are "language-bound and lan-
guage-centered; not reducible to other terms-especially not to logical outline
or analysis-but expressing their meanings through their form." 27 Most strik-
ing of all, perhaps, is his assertion that such texts are "not bound by the rule
of noncontradiction but eager to embrace competing or opposing strains of
thought; not purely intellectual, but affective and constitutive, and in this sense
integrative, both of the composer and of the audience, indeed, in a sense, of
the culture."' There is more than an echo of Walt Whitman- "Do I contra-
dict myself?/ Very well then I contradict myself,/ (I am large, I contain multi-
91 COLUD. L REV. (forthcoming June 1991).
22. See C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES ch. 1 (1973) ("Thick Description: Toward
an Interpretive Theory of Culture").
23. Id. at 6-7.
24. Miller, A Rhetoric of Law (Book Review), 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 248-49 (1985).
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tudes.)" 29-and of Emerson--"A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little
minds.... With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do."3 I do
not necessarily mean to be critical in suggesting such affinities-Emerson and
Whitman are central figures of the American pantheon, after all-- but their
own multivocality certainly presents difficulty for any analyst trying to get a
clear fix on any given argument found in their works.
Indeed, the most interesting (and longest) part of his tripartite "essay"
32
is a set of chapters-organized around the title "The Judicial Opinion as a Form
of Life"--presenting a number ofjudicial opinions not in terms of the doctrinal
rigor with which they approach the issues at hand, but rather in regard to their
conversational quality. For White, "the legal text, like every text, is a stage in
a conversation," 33 and he defines as "the true responsibilities of judging,..
. establishing a suitable character for oneself and an appropriate relation both
with the prior texts that define one's role and with other people: the responsi-
bility of creating a character and a set of relations that will make possible a
conversation 'in which democracy begins.' " The primary criterion of evalua-
tion for White is the judicial character implied by the structure, form, and tone
of an opinion, particularly its openness to a genuinely democratic discourse.
The "excellence" of judging "is definable in terms of character and relations,
in the kind of conversation it establishes, not in the 'result' or 'rule' or 'reason'
abstracted from the text in which they are given meaning. '3 Indeed, White
defines the "justice" that is the titular focus of his book as "a matter not so
much of consequences as of characters and relations: who we are to each other
in our talk and in our lives.
'36
The judicial opinion does not differ in any categorical sense from other
forms of legal writing, including his own book. Thus we read in the introduc-
tion that Justice as Translation "is itself meant to enact at least the beginnings
of such a movement" toward "the direction of completeness and inclusion, or
what in the first chapter I shall call 'integration.' "37 In any event, for White,
model texts "are not coercive of their reader, but invitational; they offer an
experience, not a message, and an experience that will not merely add to one's
29. W. WHITMAN, Song of Myself, in COMPLETE POETRY AND COLLECTED PROSE 246 (Library of
America ed. 1982).
30. R.W. EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in THE SELECTED WRrINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 152 (B.
Atkinson ed. 1950).
31. See, e.g., S. SHIFERIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND ROMANCE 159-62 (1990), for a celebration
of the relevance of these two thinkers to American constitutional analysis.
32. Not only does the word "essay" appear in the subtitle of the book, but White also refers to the book
as such at p. xiv.
33. P. 101.
34. P. 216. White adopts the notion that "democracy begins in conversation" from John Dewey. See
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stock of information but change one's way of seeing and being and talking."3
It would be truly beside the point to indicate that I received relatively little new
information or conceptual clarification from the book; that, after all, was not
the major reason it was written or what White primarily aimed to impart.
Ultimately, then, I am invited as a reviewer to report on the experience engen-
dered through reading Justice as Translation. As I already suggested, I found
the experience more vexing than enjoyable. What Richard Posner writes about
Heracles' Bow-that White's effort to explain what constitutes "law as a
humanity.., is pitched at so high a level of generality that I have trouble
holding onto the thread of his discourse" 39 -is, I am afraid, all too applicable
to Justice as Translation.
III. JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION?
The elusiveness of White's argument is well captured in the title itself,
Justice as Translation. It has become a cliche of contemporary literary theory
that all texts are read "intertextually," i.e., by reference to other texts,40 and
it is almost impossible for a contemporary American academic reader to avoid
reading White's title within the context of (and perhaps as an implicit attack
on) John Rawls' famous notion of "justice as fairness."41 Indeed, one can
easily read the book as a critique of all rationalist abstraction; I presume that
no contemporary philosopher better fits this mold than Rawls with his famous
metaphor of the "veil of ignorance"42 that serves as the basis for generating
quite abstract and relatively acontextual concepts of justice.
An animus against Rawlsian philosophy (and, indeed, against all analytic
philosophy) may be the subtext of Justice as Translation, but it is not made
a manifest part of White's argument. The discussion of the relationship between
the concept of justice and the concept of translation is limited to the final,
twelve-page chapter, which raises far more questions than it answers. "Transla-
tion," for White, is "the art of facing the impossible, of confronting unbridge-
able discontinuities between texts, between languages, and between people."43
Indeed, he has earlier written that "[w]hat we know of poetry, that it is not
paraphrasable or subject to translation, is true as well of all our our texts,
38. P. 42.
39. R. POSNER, supra note 20, at 314.
40. See THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS 112 (C. Baldrick ed. 1990):
II]ntertextuality, a term coined by Julia Kristeva to designate various relationships that a given text may
have with other texts .... In the literary theories of structuralism and post-structuralism, texts are seen to
refer to other texts (or to themselves as texts) rather than to external reality"; see also V. LEITCH,
DECONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM: AN ADVANCED INTRODUCTION 161-63 (1983) ("Intertextuality [is] a text's
dependence on and infiltration by prior codes, concepts, conventions, unconscious practices, and
texts .... ").
41. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 57 PHIL. REV. 164 (1958).
42. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
43. P. 257.
1991] 1861
The Yale Law Journal
formal and informal." 44 These strictures against paraphrasability presumably
apply to Justice as Translation itself. If one takes seriously this rather inflated
language, then there is almost literally no point to a review, which depends on
the possibility of paraphrase.
White insists that "[t]here is ...no 'translation,' only transformation
achieved in a process by which one seeks to attune oneself to another's text
and language, to appropriate them yet to respect their difference and autonomy
as well ... ."I Translation, to the extent that we. can speak of its occurring
at all, is "not about transportable 'content,' but aliout the relations-between
texts, between languages, between people-that we establish in our own
compositions; about the attitudes towards other people, other languages, that
we embody in our expressions. 4 6 One cannot, therefore, do anything so banal
as test one profferred translation against another by, for example, using a
dictionary or seeking the "expert" advice of a native speaker of the language
from which the text is being translated. Not only is there "no single appropriate
response to the text of another," there is not "even a finite appropriate set of
responses; what is called for is a kind of imaginative self-assertion in relation
to another."'47 To be sure, one can judge a profferred translation, but only "by
its coherence, by the kinds of fidelity it establishes with the original, and by
the ethical and cultural meaning it performs as a gesture of its own."4 s
Lest one read this as a counsel of despair regarding the possibility of
successful communication, White goes on to assure us that translations occur
and, indeed, do wondrous things. In particular, we are presented with a model
of "[g]ood translation"49 that "proceeds not by the motives of dominance or
acquisition, but by respect."50 Translation becomes a term standing for "a set
of practices by which we learn to live with difference, with the fluidity of
culture and with the instability of the self. It is not simply an operation of mind
on material, but a way of being oneself in relation to another being. '51 Indeed,
"the activity I call 'translation' . . . becomes a set of practices that can serve
as an ethical and political model for the law and, beyond it, as a standard of
justice., 52 Thus White "hold[s] out the good translator as a model for us, as
defining a set of intellectual and ethical possibilities from which we can learn,
both as people and as lawyers. '53
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The image of translation placed before us "asserts an essential and radical
equality among us,"' given the lack of a "superlanguage 55 that might serve
genuinely to resolve differences in our perceptions. Thus "what is necessarily
called for is a kind of negotiation between us, I from my position-embedded
in my language and culture-you from yours."56 White concedes that "[w]e
can and do make judgments, but we need to learn that they are limited and
tentative; they can represent what we think, and can be in this sense quite firm,
but they should also reflect the recognition that all this would look quite
different from some other point of view.
' 57
At this point readers might well believe that they are being directed toward
a form of relativism58 or at least being prepared for a serious discussion of
what is entailed by recognition of the particularity of our own perspectives on
the world. But there is no such discussion; instead, there is a certain verbal fog.
Thus, we are told, quite sensibly, that "respect for the other" does not "obligeE
us to erase ourselves, or our culture."59 Just as we should respect "the tradi-
tions of the other.., despite their oddness to us, and sometimes despite their
inhumanities, so too our own tradition is entitled to respect as well."6 This
injunction captures all too well the fuzziness-some might say conceptual
incoherence-that runs through the book. What the complex concept of "entitle-
ment" might mean in this context is left undiscussed. Is anything beyond sheer
existence necessary to "entitle" a tradition, whether our own or others, to
respect? The emphasized phrase suggests both that the presence in a tradition
of "inhumanitites" (whatever they may be and however they might be recog-
nized) is not enough per se to justify withdrawal of respect. White evades any
such difficulties by informing us that "[o]ur task is to be distinctively ourselves
in a world of others: to create a frame that includes both self and other, neither
dominant, in a [sic] image of fundamental equality."'" Translation, in White's
sense, "does not assert that no judgments can be reached, but is itself a way
of judging, and of doing so out of a sense of our position in a shifting
world."
62
The reader will no doubt have detected a certain impatience with all of this,
though not, I hasten to say, because I necessarily disagree with White. General-
ly speaking, I do not, and it is not clear that anyone could, at least at the level





58. Which I do not use as a scare word. See, e.g., B.H. SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE: ALTERNA-
TIVE PERSPECTIVES FOR CRITICAL THEORY (1988). But see West, Relativism, Objectivity, and Law (Book
Review), 99 YALE L. 1473 (1990) (criticizing Smith's relativism in Contingencies of Value).
59. P. 264.
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including-dare I say it-explicit conceptual analysis (even as we are usefully
reminded of the limits of such analysis). There are all sorts of problems con-
tained within White's formulations, all sorts of stumbling blocks that make it
difficult to grasp with any degree of certainty what he means to be suggesting.
The linkage between "justice" and "translation" is suggestive, to be sure, but
ultimately in the way that any link between two concepts can jog the mind and
provoke interesting thoughts.63 It is unlikely, though, that anyone seriously
interested in the now 2500-year history of contemplation about the meaning of
justice will find in Justice as Translation the sword that will help to cut any
of the Gordian knots associated with the term. The notion of "justice as transla-
tion" seems to boil down to a restatement of perhaps the oldest notion of
justice-to give each person his or her due. It leaves entirely in place the
central dilemma posed by that primal notion, which is how we decide what is
"due," how much of the particularity of desire must indeed be honored, and
how much of it may be ignored, or even ruthlessly suppressed, in order to
achieve justice.
IV. LAW AS CONVERSATION, LAW AS VIOLENCE
Probably the central question of most political theory-including theorizing
about the role of law-asks about the existence of principles that compel a
particular choice when deciding who among contending adversaries ought to
be preferred (and thus who ought to be forced to acquiesce to the social vision
of an adversary). Though White, as noted above, certainly appears to acknowl-
edge the reality of moral and social pluralism, the reality tends to be dissolved
in a haze of solidaristic aspiration. Much too often the reader is presented with
bland reassurance that "[t]he art of law is the art of integration"' or that
"what the law insists upon is that we are a discoursing community, committed
to talking with each other about our differences of perception, feeling, and
value, our differences of language and experience. '65
To put it mildly, this is not the only possible description of "what the law
insists upon." As Geoffrey Miller has noted, one of the similarities between
otherwise antagonistic proponents of law and economics and critical legal
studies is their shared perception of "the distinctive nature of law as the
application of state coercion. '66 Almost totally absent from Justice as Transla-
tion is the sensibility associated for many of us with the late Robert Cover,
63. Recall Charles Fried's description of the "lawyer as friend," Fried, supra note 10, and recall as
well Arthur Leff and Edward Dauer's withering demolition of that connection. Dauer & Leff, The Lawyer
as Friend (Correspondence), 86 YALE L.J 573 (1976) (replying to Fried).
64. P. 214.
65. P. 80.
66. Miller, supra note 24, at 257. This shared perception may be explained, at least in part, by a
common ancestor in Oliver Wendell Holmes, who emphasized that "law, being a practical thing, must be
found itself on actual forces." See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
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whose eloquent insight into the violence that underlies much (I don't think
Cover was so pessimistic as to believe all) law stands, if not as a reproach, then
certainly as a challenge to White's work.67 In stunning contrast to White's
image of the judge as grand integrator is Cover's as the killer, sometimes quite
literal, as in the case of capital punishment, sometimes "merely" metaphorical,
as when a judge, "[c]onfronting the luxuriant growth of a hundred legal tradi-
tions... assert[s] that this one is law and destroy[s] or tr[ies] to destroy the
rest."68 And do not many (most, all?) of us acknowledge that such violence
and coercion sometimes may well be justified, that some visions of social
possibility should be destroyed, even by force of arms? Consider the ruthless
suppression of the striving for Southern independence and perpetuation of a
society organized around chattel slavery of Blacks69 manifested between
1861-1865, or indeed, the contemporary events in the Persian Gulf that cost
tens of thousands of Iraqi lives in the name of vindication of international law.
To be sure, White recognizes that "[tihe law works by an act of coercion,"
but this acknowledgment is immediately undercut by his seeming confidence
that law works (or at least should work) to "create[] something new, a place
and mode of discourse, a set of relations, that form a central part of our
civilization. '7 He continues, "[A]t its best [such coercion] can work as a way
of respecting the human beings on both sides of a controversy by giving each
something to say that is appropriate to their legitimate needs and to the charac-
ter of the relation that exists between them. '71
Only an absolute churl would fail to find this vision of law, "at its best,"
attractive. But dare one say that it appears almost pollyannaish when placed
against the reality not only of secession, chattel slavery, and civil war, but even
against the more mundane problems of our contemporary life, including, say,
abortion? As Amy Gutmann has pointed out in a recent review of Laurence
Tribe's aptly named Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes, there may simply be
no way to "integrate" the dazzlingly different perspectives of the "pro-choice"
and "pro-life" adversaries in the abortion debate.72 Political prudence may
counsel "a fair moral compromise" by which proponents of abortion accept
more limitation on a woman's fundamental right of reproductive choice than
their philosophical commitments believe warranted, in return for a willingness
67. See generally Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, Foreword]; Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. 1601 (1986);
Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Rules, 20 GA. L. REV.
815 (1986).
68. Cover, Foreword, supra note 67, at 53.
69. It would be truly anachronistic to refer to those held in bondage as African-Americans, given the




72. See Gutmann, No Common Ground, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 22, 1990, at 43 (reviewing L. TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990)).
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by those for whom abortion is murder to accept some infliction of death on
morally innocent fetus-human beings in violation of their tenets. 3 But, of
course, it is just such a vision of "fair moral compromise" that underlay the
opinion of Justice Story in Prigg v. Pennsylvania74 that White castigates for
its tortuous justification of Congress's power to pass the egregious fugitive
slave law and its abject disregard for the specific fate of Margaret Morgan, the
fugitive slave whose capture in violation of Pennsylvania's "liberty law"
triggered the suit.75
By juxtaposing slavery and abortion, I most certainly do not mean to
suggest either that compromise on abortion is warranted76 or that Justice Story
was correct in preferring compromise to the disunion that he justifiably saw
over the horizon. William Lloyd Garrison might well have been correct in
burning the Constitution and crying for disunion from slaveholders. What I do
mean to suggest is that more is required of someone who would contribute to
our contemporary enlightenment than retreat to the bland platitudes pervading
Justice as Translation. This reader, at least, was moved to rebellion upon
reading yet once more about "our common life," and the importance of creating
a community, based on democratic discourse, that recognizes "that the essential
conditions of human life that it takes as its premises are shared by all of us."77
When all is said and done, White writes within a comic tradition,78 in which
the seeming dilemmas of social life dissolve into happy endings in which
enemies join hands in recognition of their commonality.
This invites us to concentrate on the sentimental reunions, in the early
twentieth century, of veterans of the Union and Confederate armies and to
ignore the quite different, and savage, reality attached to the Battle of Antietam,
the siege of Vicksburg, and Sherman's march to the sea. The constitutive under-
standings of American life, including its constitutional dimension, have been
written in blood as much as forged in conversation. At least some of the open
space allowing conversations to take place owes its creation to the willingness
to inflict the most horrible violence on persons who would not otherwise give
way. But any such recognition seems absent from this book.
It is not violence per se that requires recognition so much as the point that
not all differences can be overcome through mechanisms of "integration,"
whether institutional-political or conversational. Radical differences of percep-
tion will remain, and they must be frankly grappled with. It is such grappling
that I find ultimately missing in Justice as Translation. Perhaps this is ex-
73. Id. at 45.
74. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
75. Pp. 114-23.
76. See Dellinger, Should We Compromise On Abortion?, Am. PROSPECT, Summer 1990, at 30
(answering "no").
77. P. 157.
78. See West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 145 (1985) (correlating jurisprudential traditions with Northrop Frye's narrative myth-structures).
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plained, at least in part, by the choice of legal problems that White focuses on,
which are slavery and, especially, certain rights of criminal defendants. There
is no mention, however, of such issues as abortion, pornography, or the rights
of fundamentalist Christians to maintain their own cultures as free as possible
from the influence of a surrounding secular humanist culture. To be blunt, there
is something evasive, if not outrightly sentimental, about devoting one's
energies to attacking chattel slavery 9 or even presenting, to what will inevita-
bly be a dominantly liberal readership, views of criminal procedure that will
present no real challenge to preexisting ideological dispositions.8 0 One would
like to see White confront at least one of the problems that are tearing our
contemporary legal culture apart.
On the one occasion when he does address a topic of crucial contemporary
significance, affirmative action, the weaknesses of his approach are all too
evident. Attempting to defend affirmative action-and to suggest a way of
speaking about it that will be community-constitutive rather than a source of
further discord-he writes that the white person disfavored by an affirmative
action program should realize "that he too is a member of a community that
is seeking to rid itself of the residual and terrible evils of slavery."" He
should therefore view any burdens imposed by affirmative action "like the
soldier's burden which is in some sense a privilege to bear, even when imposed
upon a draftee, then or now." 2 One should accept an "imagined identity not
with the white slave owner, but with the white liberator." 3
Even Richard Posner, no devotee of affirmative action, finds White to have
offered "a brilliant metaphorical formulation of the case for affirmative ac-
tion."'  But it is surely question-begging as well: thus Posner suggests that
"union soldiers were fighting not to free the slaves but to preserve the union,
and the current disadvantages under which black people labor and which
affirmative action seeks to alleviate are neither comparable to, nor demonstrably
a residuum of, the evils of slavery."85 Nor does the metaphor work to explain
the justice of affirmative action in regard to, inter alia, women, Asian-Ameri-
79. As Mark Tushnet writes, "[Tlhere is something rather demeaning about making a big deal about
the proposition that slavery was a bad thing." Tushnet, supra note 14, at 113. Indeed, Justice as Translation
is dedicated to "the memory of Margaret Morgan," the victim of the injustice that became Prigg v.
Pennsylvania. See p. 114. Although the book is dedicated to Morgan, she is absent from the index (as I
learned when trying to locate quickly her moving story). Thus, the book ultimately sends decidedly mixed
messages about the genuine stature of Margaret Morgan as someone to whom, in Arthur Miller's unforgetta-
ble words, "attention must be paid." Obviously, it may be unfair to blame White, rather than his indexer,
for the omission.
80. On this Tushnet altogether accurately comments that "White's imagined reader" is "someone who
is basically sympathetic to the reforms of constitutional criminal procedure instituted by the Warren Court
and basically not terribly sensitive to the problems of maintaining order in a disorderly society." Tushnet,




84. R. POSNER, supra note 20, at 295.
85. Id.
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cans, or Hispanic-Americans. Nor, to be blunt, does it speak to the fact that
most liberal law professors rarely "enlist" in the fight against racial injustice
by, for example, choosing to forego our own well-paid, tenured positions and
accepting the anxiety and stress visited upon those who bear the primary
burdens of affirmative action programs.
86
The central point, though, is that anyone genuinely grappling with the great
issue of achieving justice within the context of America's racial dilemmas
wants more than the short discussion White gives the reader; one would like
to see more of a confrontation with the extensive literature about the various
moralities and immoralities of affirmative action. And given White's ostensible
commitment to paying close attention to the stories of others, one wants some
greater acknowledgment of the perspectives of the white (and some might
suggest Black") "losers" in affirmative action programs, perspectives that
would allow us to understand (and perhaps even "respect") the rage that they
often direct at facile supporters of such programs. His metaphor, however
brilliant, smells of the scholar's lamp or, perhaps more accurately, the scholar's
armchair out of which this book seems to have been written. Nor is this the
only example where White seems to evade his own advice to listen carefully
to one's own opponents. As Mark Tushnet notes, White "systematically down-
plays the claims made on behalf of 'law-and-order."' 88 When discussing the
law of search and seizure, and the possible perspective of a police officer in
regard to this body of law, White's imagined voice of the police officer is
treated "with an attitude somewhere in between indifference and contempt." 89
Tushnet, certainly not identified with what White appears to dismiss as an
"authoritarian" 9 desire for law and order, goes on to imagine a serious and,
indeed, quite moving phenomenological self-description of the police officer's
perspective.91 Would that White had done likewise.
V. FORM, CONTENT, AND THE ASSESSMENT OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS
One difference between this book and White's earlier writings is that this
one concentrates on law, particularly as manifested in judicial opinions, in
contrast to the emphasis in much of the earlier books on more traditionally
86. At this point, the metaphor of "conscription" might take on a decidedly different meaning from
the one intended by White, for the history of American conscription is riddled with the kinds of exceptions
that have too often justified gibes such as "a rich man's war, but a poor man's [and, in our more progressive
age, women's] fight." One should never forget, for example, that the Civil War itself, the first to be fought
in substantial measure by conscripted soldiers, allowed one to buy out of the duty to serve by the payment
of $300. In any event, the patterns of "conscription" that one finds in regard to affirmative action rarely
meet any strong notion of equally shared burdens and too often foist on vulnerable whites the duty to make
up for the discriminatory acts of elite whites who continue to enjoy their privileged positions in society.
87. See Carter, The Best Black, and Other Tales, RECONSTRUCTION, No.1, 1990, at 6.
88. Tushnet, supra note 14, at 107.
89. Id.
90. P. 157.
91. Tushnet, supra note 14, at 108-09.
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"literary" materials. But there is a clear connection between his evaluation of
literature and these judicial opinions. White clearly shares the classic humanist's
faith in the ability of fine literature to help form fine character. Much could be
said, of course, about the assumption that the quality of literature (or law) that
one reads will importantly shape the reader's life in significant ways. I person-
ally tend to doubt that reading "fine" literature or listening to great music has
much to do with making one a decent person; there are just too many cultured
scoundrels-not to mention "uncultured" persons of great moral integrity-in
both our past and recent histories. But my skepticism about White's argument
goes beyond such empirical data.
"You cannot write a great novel in support of anti-semitism, says Sartre,
and I think," White adds, that "you cannot write a great opinion that denies that
sense of the ultimate value of the individual person that is necessarily enacted
in any sincerely other-recognizing expression.""2 In order to be an interesting
sentence, this must mean more than that one defines greatness in a novel as
avoiding anti-Semitism or greatness in an opinion as vindicating the ultimate
importance of the individual. The sentence then becomes mere tautology.
Rather, White must be asserting that there is an integral connection between
the moral vision of a work and its formal qualities. One simply cannot use the
various techniques that mark one as a "great writer" in order to compose a
writing that conveys the specific message of anti-Semitism or anti-individual-
ism.
For White, as already suggested, the form of the opinion should embody
the commitment to conversation and to a multiplicity of perspectives as elabo-
rated above. It is not enough to state one's commitment to such things; the
opinion must actually demonstrate their possibility. As White writes, "[W]hat
distinguishes the work of a good judge is not the vote [or even the doctrinal
'message' conveyed by the opinion] but the achievement of mind, essentially
literary in character, by which the results are given meaning in the context of
the rest of law, the rest of life."93 He clearly shares what he describes as "our
faith as lawyers" 94 that the discipline required to write a series of opinions
"is itself deeply educative," training "the mind and sensibility of the individual
judge-and of the collectivity of judges, of the lawyers and the public" in such
a way that "over time the decisions in the cruder sense, the votes, as well as
the opinions, will be more sound, more intelligent, and more just."'95 The
"excellence" of judging "is definable... in the kind of conversation it estab-
lishes, not in the 'result' or 'rule' or 'reason' abstracted from the text in which
92. P. 158.
93. P. 92.
94. Id. (emphasis added). It is banal, but necessary, to ask precisely to whom the "our" refers: is it
White's ideal reader, his conception of his likely reader, or any American lawyer who might pick up his
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they are given meaning.' 9 6 To some extent, this seems to be a reiteration of
the importance of a particular notion of judicial craft that allows us to recognize
as "great" an opinion that we strongly disagree with, though I take it we could
never reject it on the basis of its being unjust, since by definition an opinion
could not be great and unjust at the same time.
It is easiest to challenge such notions in regard to literature. Consider, as
a rather obvious example, The Merchant of Venice. (I assume that Sartre's
comment applies to plays as much as to novels.) Though one might cavil
whether it is accurately described as "support of anti-semitism," it seems clear
to me at least that it can be read as such.97 Perhaps this diminishes its stature
and makes it a less great play than it might have been, but does it make it not
a great play at all? Similar questions could obviously be asked of some of the
poetry of T. S. Eliot or the novels of Celine, more clearly anti-Semitic but
presumably less canonically "great" than Shakespeare's play. In any event,
White's comment seems empirically problematic (how would one test its
validity?). More to the point, it seems as well to suggest that art is defined in
terms of its relationship to an already known and accepted political or moral
theory. But surely one function of art is to lead us to what Nietzsche termed
transvaluation, to turn our established views upside down through the tech-
niques available to the artist of genius.
As we turn from novels and plays to judicial artifacts, can we still wonder
if there are really no "great" opinions, in terms of capturing the "art" of the
lawyer-judge, that are nonetheless pernicious in terms of the moral vision they
articulate? Once again, it would seem that only someone committed to a comic
vision of law could believe this to be the case. But consider Richard Posner's
comment about Justice Holmes's notorious opinion in Buck v. Bell:98 Posner
does not hesitate to describe Holmes' opinion as "poorly reasoned, brutal, and
even vicious," but that does not prevent him from describing it as "a first-class
piece of rhetoric-thus demonstrating, like Antony's speech, that there is no
inherent moral or truth value in rhetoric." 99 White would presumably have
96. P. 217.
97. I offer as evidence my reactions to the superb production of the play mounted last year in New
York City that starred Dustin Hoffman and Geraldine James. These reactions are based, among other things,
on the ultimately "comic" (as opposed to "tragic") resolution of the drama that includes the forced
conversion of Shylock to Christianity, the demand for which is portrayed as a sign of Portia's "mercy"
inasmuch as she could have, given her lawyerly skills, called for his death as just retribution for his attempt
to gain the "pound of flesh" from the noble Antonio. There is certainly precedent in the critical literature
about Shakespeare for reading Shylock within the "codes ... of anti-Semitism." See, e.g., G. TAYLOR,
REINVENTING SHAKEsPEARE: A CULTURAL HISTORY FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE PRESENT 233 (1989).
Given my earlier quoted comment about multiple interpretations of Hamlet, literally the last thing I
want to do is argue that The Merchant of Venice is "necessarily" anti-Semitic or that thoroughly able
interpreters cannot skillfully turn it into an attack on anti-Semitism. The central question is simply whether
the formal "greatness" of the play, assuming we think it great at all, depends on resolving the question of
its stance as to the iniquity of anti-Semitism.
98. 274 U.S. 200, 205-07 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (upholding mandatory sterilization for "feeble-minded"
institutionalized persons, saying, "Three generations of imbeciles are enough").
99. R. POSNER, supra note 20, at 289.
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little trouble disagreeing with Posner insofar as he would define "first-class"
judicial rhetoric quite differently, in terms of its inviting a kind of conversation
so totally lacking in either Buck v. Bell or Antony's magnificent exercise in
audience manipulation.
This, however, only returns us to the question of the extent to which
White's jurisprudence elides certain crucial questions by adopting as part of
its definition the performance of specific functions, whether they be "integra-
tion" or, as in the quotation above, "that sense of the ultimate value of the
individual person that is necessarily enacted in any sincerely other-recognizing
expression."1 0 As Stanley Fish has pointed out, White wants ultimately to
define law (and for that matter literature) as "simulacra of" his own self-
conception: "open, tolerant, generous, all encompassing, committed to no
particular program or point of view because they are large enough to accommo-
date all."101
Though White's assessments of judicial opinions might be problematic, his
test cannot be said to be vacuous. He delivers some interesting criticisms of
judges whom one might expect White to have applauded, given his presumably
liberal substantive politics. Thus, although it is no surprise that White castigates
William Howard Taft's wooden reading of the Fourth Amendment in Olmstead
v. United States,1°2 one notes that he criticizes as well Justice Black's "author-
itarian claim" that he has found in the Bill of Rights "a certain and clear body
of law by which 'due process of law' could be defined."
1'
From White's perspective, "authoritarian" opinions are presumably always
defective regardless of the context in which they are delivered. But this assump-
tion raises important political questions of its own. Kenneth Karst, concluding
his generally admiring review of Justice as Translation, notes that Chief Justice
Warren's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education04 is probably more "au-
thoritarian" than White would like, but is not, according to Karst, any the less
great for that. Many of the decisions that followed Brown are aptly described
by Karst as "grunts" rather than conversations, "curt orders that offered no
explanation beyond citations to Brown L." '°5 Indeed, Karst seems to suggest
that there are times when the most appropriate tone for a judge to adopt is
precisely that of, in White's words, the priest "declar[ing] the meaning of the
100. See supra text accompanying note 92.
101. Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist ision, 60 TEX. L. REV. 495, 505 (1982).
102. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
103. P. 148. Elsewhere, however, White cites Justice Black as possessing the "authenticity of mind"
that he most admires. P. 224.
104. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Interestingly, this case is not discussed by White.
105. Karst, The Interpreters (Book Review), 88 MICH. L REv. 1655, 1660 (1990) (reviewing J.B.
WHrrE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION (1990)). He cites as examples State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359
U.S. 533 (1959) (state-regulated athletic contests); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege,
358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)
(beaches).
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sacred language ' '""6 to a public that is expected to submit, and the declaration
by Brown and its progeny of a new vision of racial justice, however flawed it
may have been, might well have been just such an occasion.107
Or consider Cooper v. Aaron,108 where the Court asserted its highly con-
troversial-indeed, dubious-claim to be the "ultimate interpreter" of the
Constitution. The proclamation of authority (backed up ultimately by federal
bayonets) occurred in the context of the most serious challenge to federal
authority since the Civil War, Governor Orval Faubus's refusal to accept the
desegregation of the Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. "Whatever
style a Justice may choose," Karst reminds us, "at bottom law is command,
even when it is commanding tolerance of political outsiders or inclusion of
religious outsiders. To the Governor of Arkansas who sought to keep black
children out of Little Rock's Central High School, the Supreme Court properly
spoke in the stem tones of Authority."'1 9 Would White have had the Court
"converse" with Faubus about either the potential merits of a segregated society
or the potential legitimacy of a State's refusing to accept Brown as the law of
the land? I do not mean these as entirely rhetorical questions. A serious person
might prefer a less "authoritarian" opinion than Cooper, " 0 even while recog-
nizing that an opinion acknowledging the possible legitimacy of multiple
perspectives about desegregation might well have given aid and comfort to
white racists and further hindered what sentiment existed for acquiescence to
desegregation. But surely one can applaud, upon attentiveness to context, the
vigor of the Court's language in Cooper and the refusal to dignify as conversa-
tion-worthy Governor Faubus's racism.
I wish that White had chosen to assess Brown or Cooper. Even more to the
point, I wish he had challenged more directly the likely biases of his most
sympathetic readers, whom I suspect are largely left-liberal. Although he has
interesting things to say about judicial writings ranging from Justice Story's
opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania"' to the opinions in United States v. Robin-
son,12 the last of a sequence of search-and-seizure cases that White examines,
I doubt that they will lead many readers to engage at sufficient depth with the
real questions posed by this aspect of White's enterprise.
106. P. 148.
107. See Karst, supra note 105, at 1660.
108. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
109. Karst, supra note 105, at 1660 (footnote omitted).
110. I certainly have no hesitation in rejecting Cooper's "papalist" claims to "ultimate authority" in
offering constitutional interpretations. See S. LEVINSON, supra note 19, at 9-53.
111. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
112. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). White also offers a very brief discussion of United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979), pp. 218-21.
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VI. CONVERSATION OR MONOLOGUE?
What most led to my negative response to the experience of reading Justice
as Translation was, however, not so much the various conceptual problems left
unresolved by the book-what book, after all, could survive any rigorous
application of that test?113 -as White's failure to indicate any real engagement
with the many other writers who are grappling with similar concepts and
attempting to deal with problems they raise. If White were portraying himself
as an unabashed egoist, that would be one thing. But he presents himself as a
man committed above all to conversation and the creation of supportive, multi-
voiced communities. We have just seen that he applies such values to the
analysis of judicial opinions and criticizes even result-attractive opinions, such
as Justice Black's, that suggest the authoritarian priest rather than the commit-
ted'14 conversationalist. And recall the presentation of Justice as Translation
as a model enactment of his commitments. All of these factors, far more than
simple disagreement with some of the specific arguments, are what ultimately
explain my deep disappointment upon reading the book.
An important clue to what is is most distressing about Justice as Translation
is provided by looking at its index, where the reader will notice numerous
omissions of persons who have contributed to the discussion of which Justice
as Translation is a part. Most noticeable, surely, is the absence of any reference
to Nietzsche, whose thoughts on "perspectivism '1 5 might be thought highly
relevant to someone with White's ostensible views. Nietzsche, of course, is
scarcely a bland figure committed to White's reassuring notions of equality and
democratic conversation. He is also dead, so it would be hard to engage in
genuine conversation with him. This is certainly not the case with Richard
Rorty, and one would like to know what White thinks of Rorty's far more
attractive and explicitly liberal presentation (detractors would probably say
domestication) of perspectivism.1"6 But Rorty also makes no appearance, so
we do not know. It is also worth mentioning in this context Bruce Ackerman's
Social Justice and the Liberal State, almost certainly the most systematic effort,
at least within the legal academy, to ground social justice in the imperatives
of conversational dialogue,117 but similarly unmentioned.
113. My own book, Constitutional Faith, supra note 19, certainly could not.
114. And protestant: thus White contrasts the "authoritarian claim" of privileged "authority to declare
the meaning of the sacred language" to the "fact" of "the individual's responsibility to engage as an
autonomous and present person" in the interpretation of the sacred texts. P. 148.
115. See, e.g., A. NEHAMAS, NIETZSCHE, LIFE AS LITERATURE 158 (1985).
116. See, e.g., R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
117. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). There is, of course, an extensive
literature outside the legal academy on the relationship between notions of conversation and the derivation
of norms of social justice. For a helpful introduction, see Benhabib, Liberal Dialogue Versus a Critical
Theory of Discursive Legitimation, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 143-56 (N. Rosenblum ed. 1989)
(discussing especially the work of Ackerman and Jargen Habermas).
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Among the most fruitful explorers of conversation and the implications of
differing perspectives, of course, have been feminists, but no feminist author
appears in the pages of this book. The most notable omission in this regard is
probably Martha Minow's 1987 Foreword to the Harvard Law Review,118
which eloquently sets out the importance of adopting the validity of multiple
perspectives, though her work is only one such example.1 9 But White's read-
er would get nary a clue about the existence of this literature. 2 It is as if
feminists have written nothing.
The same can be said of those analysts of race who have emphasized the
importance of developing multiple perspectives. One thinks immediately of
Derrick Bell, Alan Freeman, Mari Matsuda, Richard Delgado, and Patricia Wil-
liams.121 One need not enter the debate provoked by Randall Kennedy's im-
portant article about the merits of some of the so-called "critical race theory"
scholarship" in order to recognize its obvious affinities with aspects of
White's own project and its relevance to anyone who views a central task of
law as developing a greater receptivity to the presence of "different voices" in
our legal conversations." Nor is any notice taken of Robert Burt's work over
what is now more than a decade, which insists with great eloquence on the
importance not only of sensitivity to the perspective of the other, but also, with
equal passion, on the duty to embrace the other and forge new bonds of family
or community.' There is a similar ignoring of the work that has come out
of the critical legal studies movement that has often insisted on just such
"fluidity" of language that leads to "indeterminacy" of outcomes and thus
118. Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L REV.
10 (1987); see also M. MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN
LAW (1990). It is not at all a coincidence that one of Minow's substantive interests is bilingualism and
bilingual education, certainly one of the most dramatic symbols of the reality of "different voices." See id.
at 19-23, 26-29, 31-40.
119. For work published before 1988, presumably the last year before White sent the manuscript to
the University of Chicago Press for publication, see, in addition to Minow's Foreword, supra note 118,
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987); Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and
the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11 (1985) (Isabel Marcus and Paul J. Spiegelman,
moderators; Ellen C. DuBois, Mary C. Dunlap, Carol 3. Gillgan, Catharine A. MacKinnon, and Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, conversants).
120. There is an index entry for Robin West, but the reader is led only to a footnote citing her debate
with Richard Posner about Franz Kafka and law and economics. See p. 275 n.Il (citing West, Authority,
Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard
Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985), and West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge
Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1449 (1986)).
121. See, e.g., D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987);
Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discriminaton Through Anti-Discrimination Law:
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L REV. 1049 (1978); Matsuda, Public Response
to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Williams, Alchemical
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
122. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1988).
123. See, e.g., Getman, Voices, 66 TEX. L. REV. 577 (1988); Yudof, "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon": The
Human Voice in Legal Rules, 66 TEX. L. REV. 589 (1988).
124. See generally R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT
REALTIONS (1979).
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makes orthodox legal analysis, with its quest for determinate solutions, impossi-
ble."z There are many ways in which White's position seems quite similar
to those identified with these various branches of contemporary legal dis-
course-is he a "crit" who has not yet come out of the closet?-but it is hard
to tell, insofar as he relentlessly refuses to acknowledge that there is in fact a
vigorous, indeed often acrimonious, conversation that is taking place all around
him about the very issues that he is ostensibly most interested in.
Finally, there seem some obvious analogues between White's arguments
and some of those associated with the "neo-republicanism" of Frank
Michelman, 126 who presents a conversational model of judging, even if some
argue that it seems to limit, when all is said and done, the conversational
community to the judges. 2 7 Michelman does appear in the index, but only
as the author of a 1978 article on law and economics, White's bte noire. That
is not all of Miechelman's work that should be of profound interest to White.
Just as importantly, there is nothing resembling serious confrontation with
the thoughtful critics of perspectivism and of feminism, critical legal studies,
postmodernism, and other such styles of the contemporary intellectual scene
that embrace one or another variety of antifoundationalism. Such critics, for
example, are curious about the basis for identifying the "inhumanities" that
they, like White, are prepared to recognize, including chattel slavery. If un-
grounded, do such identifications simply stand as referents to the existence of
interpretive communities that regard these practices, which may, after all, be
quite common and supported by quite sophisticated theoretical defenses, as "bad
things"?
Why have I devoted so much space to bibliography mongering, rather than
merely focused on problems within White's own thought? Am I doing anything
more than engaging in the highly dubious practice of a reviewer wishing out
loud that the author had written a different book? Or do the omissions men-
tioned go to the heart of the book that he did write? The answers, perhaps
paradoxically, lie in White's commitment to the centrality of conversation, a
theme that pervades the book. Recall White's assertion "that the legal text, like
every text, is a stage in a conversation and ask of it: Is this conversation one
in which 'democracy begins?""' I find this commitment to conversation, and
to democracy, extremely attractive. However, I view this book as being far
more about the abstract desirability of engaging in conversation than an exem-
plification of a good conversation "in which 'democracy begins."' What is
given the reader is not a model of how one converses, but rather an extended,
125. See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
126. See Michelman, The Supreme Court. 1985 Term--Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L. 1493 (1988).
127. See Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE LJ. 1, 28-37 (1989).
128. P. 101.
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quite repetitive, monologue. Insofar as one purpose of the book is to provide
a model of how to enact a conversation, it fails.
It is not that White's enterprise is not a significant one or that the task he
set himself could not be done. Consider, for example, The Company We Keep:
An Ethics of Fiction,"2 9 a book published in 1988, that has quite similar aims
to those set out by White. Its author is Wayne C. Booth, who, not at all coinci-
dentally, is a former colleague of White at the University of Chicago and a
continuing friend. 130 Booth is trying to revive a distinctly unfashionable enter-
prise-the analysis (and assessment) of works of literature in terms of their
"entire range of effects on the 'character' or 'person' or self.'"" 3' He takes
very seriously the metaphor of authors, and the books they write, as "friends,"
and, like Socrates, 32 he is well aware of the shaping effects that friends have
on one another.
Writing of William Butler Yeats, for example, Booth notes that "[h]e wins
my friendship, as my real friends [i.e., flesh-and-blood friends, including, one
presumes, James Boyd White] do, by offering a distinctive, engaging way of
being together, one of many possible ways of addressing a world of conflicting
values."'1 33 Discussing what he calls "the ethics of narration," Booth says that
the reader must always ask if "the pattern of life" offered her by an author is
"one that friends might well pursue together? Or is this the offer of a sadist
to a presumed masochist? Of a seducer or rapist to a victim? Of the exploiter
to the exploited?"' 34 Thus, of the works (and their authors) he admires
most-King Lear, The Cherry Orchard, and War and Peace, to name only
three-Booth says that their authors are "friends" whose friendship is manifest-
ed not only in contributing to his pleasure and "not only in the promise they
fulfill of proving useful to me, but finally in the irresistible invitation they
extend to live during these moments a richer and fuller life than I could manage
on my own."'
135
A truly commendable work of literature "lead[s] me first to practice ways
of living that are more profound, more sensitive, more intense, and in a curious
way more fully generous than I am likely to meet anywhere else in the
world."' 36 And Booth's capacity for such friendship is profoundly egalitarian,
for the fine work of literature "show[s] what life can be, not just to a coterie,
129. W. BOOTH, THE COMPANY WE KEEP: AN ETHICS OF FICTION (1988).
130. See id. at xi; p. xvii.
131. W. BOOTH, supra note 129, at 8.
132. See PLATO, GORGIAS 121 (T. Irwin trans. Penguin ed. 1979). This has been a recurrent theme
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he is scrutinizing-in that specific instance Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France-"How then
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both White and Booth, texts can be our friends just as much as concrete individuals.
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a saved and saving remnant looking down on the fools, slobs, and knaves, but
to anyone who is willing to work to earn the title of equal and true friend.'
1 37
The parallels between Booth's and White's enterprises should be obvious, as
should be the importance of the questions Booth (and White) raises about the
impact of literature (or judicial opinions) on their readers.
What makes Booth's book far more satisfying than White's, though, is
precisely the enactment by the former of what it means to participate fully in
a conversational community. Here, too, the dedication is telling: "For Paul
Moses 1929-1966." Moses was an African-American colleague of Booth's who
raised the possibility that Huck Finn might be deeply racist.138 Booth, to put
it mildly, was disinclined to accept the point, or the associated argument that
it constituted "bad education" to subject students to it. Far more important than
the abstract words of the dedication is the fact that this 500-page book is a
series of reflections on the themes suggested by Moses; in a moving final
chapter, Booth indicates how he has been led to see the possible validity of the
points raised by Moses some quarter century ago. The Company We Keep is
one of the most profound acts of friendship I have ever encountered. And,
along the way, Booth pays careful attention to those writing about the issues
he addresses, ranging from ethical relativism to feminism. (As to the latter,
Booth notes how feminist critics have led him to reevaluate his earlier enthusi-
asm for Rabelais.) I warmly recommend the book to any reader seeking not
only a fine presentation of the argument that it matters what models of literature
(or of law) are placed before the young (and not so young), but also, and
perhaps more importantly, an example of what it means, at its best, to manifest
one's membership in, and friendship for, a community of equals.
Nor is Booth unique in exemplifying how actually to perform White's
suggested enterprise. It is a deep irony, given White's attack on the language
and culture instilled by economistic reasoning, 139 that Richard Posner conveys
a far more vivid sense of the engaged conversationalist than does James Boyd
White. Although my own views and political values are far closer to White's
than to Posner's, I have the constant sense when reading Posner's recent work
of a man aware of the multiplicity of voices engaging in legal arguments and
making good-faith efforts to grapple with what they are saying. Indeed, what
makes Posner one of the most interesting presences in contemporary intellectual
life is precisely the sense that there is development in his thought, that it is
truly worthwhile to engage with him. That is precisely what is absent in the
recent work of White.
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Perhaps admirers of White's previous work will turn to Justice as Transla-
tion in the same spirit that admirers of certain genre novelists await forthcoming
novels, secure in the confidence that their authors will present a reworking of
themes that they have already made their own. What is true about even the best
of such novelists-say Anne Tyler, from whose books I have received great
pleasure over the years-is that there may be no great need to read all of her
novels. Few of her readers will expect her next novel to differ all that much
from what has come before. If one missed her last novel, it is no big deal, for
others will undoubtedly come along, mining the same ore.
James Boyd White has given us some real gold in his earlier work, but I
am afraid that he increasingly seems to be repolishing the same nuggets, and
they no longer seems to be so fresh and interesting as they once were. But if
that were my only objection, the tone of this review would have been far
different, for no one can be expected always to produce masterpieces. What
is far more important, and what does account for its tone, is the sense of
betrayal experienced at least by this reader of White's eloquently stated com-
mitment to conversation inasmuch as he almost resolutely ignores what is being
said all around him about his own central issues. A monologue is not a conver-
sation, and it is not a model for democracy, either.
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